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The purpose of this report is to give a brief account of the activities of the Monetary
Committee during the period from  /5  May  /969  to 30 June /970.
During this period, the Committee held nineteen meetings and its working parties met on
many occasions.
Following the departure of Jonkheer Mr. E. van Lennep, appointed Secretary-General
of DECD, the Committee, at its meeting of  and 10 January /970, unanimously elected
as Chairman M. B. Clappier, Deputy Governor of the Banque de France,for the remainder
of M. van Lennep s term of office, and as Vice-Chairman Professor W. Drees, Treasurer-
General in the Netherlands Ministry of Finance, for the remainder of M. Clappier s term.
A list of the members of the Committee is annexed.
The report was adopted on 30 June /970. /t takes no account of subsequent monetary and
financial trends or measures in or outside the Community.1. In the period reviewed in this report, the inflationary tendencies discernible in the
Community since 1968 persisted and indeed strengthened in varying degree, while the
balance of payments disequilibrium deteriorated, leading to exchange rate adjustments
in France and Germany. These developments and the various measures taken by the
member coutries to cope with them largely determined the nature of the tasks carried out
by the Committee, which on several occasions held prior consultation meetings in con~
formity with current Community rules.
The Committee also continued its work on fuller co-ordination of economic and monetary
policy within the Community. In particular, it had occasion to render Opinions on the
appropriate prior consultation procedures, in line with the Council decision of 17 July 1969
on the co-ordination of short-term economic policies of the Member States, and on the
implementing procedures for a Community system of medium-term financial aid.
I n the field of international monetary relations, a number of important decisions were
taken; here, the Committee helped to harmonize the positions to be adopted by the Six
in more general international negotiations; the subjects dealt with in consultations included
the creation of special drawing rights and the five-yearly revision of the quotas in the
International Monetary Fund.
2. The pressure of work on current problems and the allocation of additional tasks
forced the Committee to spend less time on the periodical examination of the monetary
and financial situation of the member countries. Regular reviews and special examinations
at consultation meetings replaced in some measure the traditional systematic studies. It
is also clear that in future the Committee will have to devote more and more of its time
to international monetary policies of the member countries. This is in line with the ob-
jectives set out in the Hague communique concerning the establishment by stages of an
economic and monetary union among the Six.
GENERAL SURVEY OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
COMMUNITY AND MAJOR NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES
3. The period of boom business conditions which had started in the Community in 1968
continued throughout 1969, and in most member countries, indeed, there were unmis-
takable signs of strain. Real gross Community product rose by 7,1% in 1969, a record
since the inception of the Common Market. Growth was particularly rapid in Germany,
France and Luxembourg. It was also lively in Belgium and satisfactory, though a little
slower than in 1968, in Italy and the Netherlands.4. This development was, however, accompanied by inflationary pressures which
strengthened in most member countries in the period under review. Although production
again showed a surprising degree of elasticity, particularly in the first haIf of 1969, potential
overall demand gradually moved ahead of overall supply and cost increases outstripped
productivity gains, mainly because various raw materials were in short supply and because
there was an increasing number of bottlenecks on the labour markets of most member
countries. In the course of the year, the price trend in the Community was, in general
mounting vigorously both at the production stage and at the various stages of distribution;
consumer prices rose by 4 '8%, the sharpest increase since the Common Market was set
up.
The following table shows clearly how the inflationary process gathered speed.
Growth of GNP in the member countries and the Community
in 1968 and 1969
(% change on preceding year)
Value Prices Volume
1968 1969 1968 1969 1968 1969
Germany 8.9 11.6 1.6
Italy 1.5
Netherlands 10. 11.7 6.3
Belgium lOA 2.4 3~8
Luxembourg 15.
EEet 11.4
1 Value : calculated on the basis of the official exchange rates, account being taken of the parity changes made in 1969 in
France and Germany.
Volume: calculated on the basis of the official exchange rates in force in 1963.
5. In the Community, faster growth in 1969 was the result of an expansion of external
and internal demand. The strength of Community exports remained satisfactory. In terms
of value, visible exports to non-member countries were 11% higher than in the previous
year. There was also a very distinct rise in internal demand. Gross fixed asset for-
mation expanded sharply while private consumers' expenditure gathered momentum
under the influence of a rapid rise in disposable incomes of households. The very lively
upswing in internal demand was matched by exceptionally vigorous expansion in the
field of intra-Community trade and imports from non-member countries. In terms of
value, visible trade between the member countries went up by almost 30% while visible
imports by the Community from non-member countries were 17% higher than in 1968.6. In 1969, member countries' imports from the United States and, to a lesser degree,
from the developing countries mounted sharply and the surplus on the Community
balance of trade ($1 200m. as against $3200m. in 1968) therefore contracted. As the in~
crease in the surplus on services was almost completely offset by a heavier deficit on
transfer payments, the surplus on current account fell sharply ($ 1 600m. as against $3 500m.
in 1968). There were also heavy net outflows of long-term capital, .especially private
capital, and the Community s basic balance therefore closed with a deficit of the order
of $7 OOOm. (as against $1700m. in 1968). Including all other items (short-term capital
movements, errors and omissions), the total payments deficit was $6100m. Of this,
$4 450m. was financed by a reduction in net official gold and foreign exchange reserves
(including the net position with the IMF) and $2 260m. by a deterioration in the net short-
term external position of the banking sector.
7. In Germany, demand built up vigorously in 1969. There was a particularly rapid rise
in investment and exports, but from the autumn onwards, private consumers' expenditure
was also gathering distinct momentum.
The labour market came under increasing strain. Production expanded considerably,
thanks to a fresh and significant improvement in productivity and the recruitment of more
foreign workers. In terms of volume, GNP was 8% higher than in 1968 while industrial
production advanced by about 13%.
The upward thrust of prices gathered distinct momentum from the autumn onwards,
notably as a result of major wage awards in a large number of industries.
On current account, the balance of payments showed a heavy surplus, but long-term
capital exports easily offset this. Until the autumn, inflows of speculative short-term
capital boosted gold and foreign exchange reserves. The period of relative calm which
followed the wave of speculation of May 1969 was of short duration. During September
1969, inflows of short-term capital reached alarming proportions and forced the Bundes~
bank to intervene on a very large scale. In the circumstances, the Government decided
to close the foreign exchange markets in Germany from 24 September 1969. On 30 Sep-
tember, immediately following the elections, the authorities decided to allow the mark
to float, i.e. to discontinue, until further notice, intervention on the exchange market to
keep the exchange rate within the limits fixed under the Bretton Woods agreements.
This measure and even more the decision to revalue the mark by 9,29%, taken on 27 Octo-
ber 1969, triggered off a rapid outflow of short-term .capital, so that the situation on the
exchange markets reverted to normal. The reserves of various countries which had run
into difficulties because of the speculation on the mark now built up again.
Although at the beginning of 1970 exports returned to a more normal level, overall demand
in Germany is still very buoyant. Production rose again considerably, but there was also
a very appreciable rise in prices.
8. In France, the internal and external disequilibria which had developed after the strikes
of May and June 1968 persisted and indeed grew worse during the greater part of 1969.
The uncertainties connected with political or social deadlines and the international
monetary situation influenced the behaviour of producers, dealers and consumers. As
a result, the restrictive measures adopted at the end of 1968, including the credit restric-
tions, which were intensified the .following spring, took longer to "bite" than wouldotherwise have been the case. For a fairly long period demand outstripped production
capacities, curbing exports and entailing a sharp rise in imports. The cost of living con-
tinued to increase, the annual rate being about 6%. Maintenance of the exchange controls
made it possible to avoid very heavy outflows of capital of the scate registered in May
and November 1968. Nevertheless, in the first half of 1969 the balance of payments deficit,
which had already touched $3200m. in 1968, was close on $1 700m., partly because of
a "leads and lags" effect.
At the beginning of August 1969, the Government decided to devalue the franc by 11.1 1 %.
This measure was to have an important psychological impact but this did not affect the
need for a rigorous recovery programme in support. Fresh moves were made to eliminate
the budget deficit gradually and ensure that in 1970 revenue and expenditure would be
back in equilibrium. The limits placed on the expansion of credit to trade and industry
were tightened and Bank rate was raised to 8%. Internal liquidity creation slowed down
sharply and the rate of expansion of the money supply (including near-money) dropped
to 6% from 1I% in 1968 while the money supply in the narrow definition hardly increased
at all.
From the autumn onwards the pressure of domestic demand gradually slackened, particu-
larly in respect of private consumption. As there was first a reversal in the "leads and
lags" effect and subsequently an improvement in the trade account, heavy surpluses
replaced the previous deficits on foreign trade and payments~ in the end, the payments
deficit for the year as a whole was no heavier than it had been at the end of the first half
of the year. I n the spring of 1970, France was able to payoff the balance of its short-term
debts contracted abroad while increasing its gross foreign exchange holdings.
Supported by a strong wave of investment and exports and by the drive to replenish
stocks, growth remained very dynamic, both during the closing months of 1969 and in the
. early months of 1970. GNP for 1969 expanded by some 8% in volume terms and forecasts
under the economic budget for 1970 have been revised upwards very appreciably. Al-
though prices are still rising too rapidly, strain has eased in most industries.
9. In Italy, the phase of rapid expansion that began in the summer of 1968 came to an
abrupt end in the last four months of 1969 because of a wave of strikes of unusual propor-
tions. They cut back the growth of GNP at constant prices to 5% while there had been
good reason to expect an expansion of 7% before the social disturbances started. For
the year as a whole, however, all components of domestic demand gathered slight mo-
mentum, reflected in an extremely rapid expansion of imports.
At the beginning of 1970, the Italian economy entered a phase in which the economy
was making good previous production losses, but this trend was hampered by further
strikes. In the first quarter, industrial production was about 5% up on the level of a year
earlier.
On the labour market, unemployment fell sharply and there was a shortage of skilled
labour in some areas.
The upward thrust of prices gathered momentum throughout 1969, and in the first quarter
of 1970 consumer prices were almost 5% higher than a year earlier, compared with an
average increase of 2-8% in 1969. As for the balance of payments, there was a slight
decline in the surplus on current account and a considerable rise in outflows of capital.The overall deficit reached $1 400m., compared with a surplus of$600m. in 1968. Despite
this deterioration, the net official gold and foreign exchange reserves fell only slightly,
mainly because of heavy imports of short-term funds by the banks.
10. In the Netherlands, economic expansion remained rapid in 1969. The lively growth
of overall demand was supported by faster export growth. The expansion of fixed invest-
ment, by contrast, slowed down and the growth of private consumers' expenditure
slackened distinctly in terms of volume. Although the growth of world trade has tended
to weaken since the beginning of 1970, there are no important signs of the business trend
in the Netherlands weakening.
Under the persistent pressure of demand and despite mounting strains on the labour
market, domestic supply was remarquably elastic. Industrial production rose by 12,5%,
as against 11% in 1968, while GNP in real terms expanded by 5%, following a rise of6-2%
in 1968-
In the early months of 1969, the price climate deteriorated appreciably, not only because
factors in the business trend forcing up prices were strengthening but also because of the
repercussions of the introduction of V AT. In 1969, consumer prices went up by 7,5%,
the sharpest increase since 1951. In the first quarter of 1970, the year-to-year rise was
only 3,4%.
The current account deteriorated in 1969. However, if stocks are included, the external
position is seen to have improved appreciably.
With funds flowing in from abroad, particularly after revaluation of the mark, and the
authorities making considerable use of the money market because tax receipts fell short
of estimates, the tightening of liquidity was not as pronounced as had been expected. For
these reasons the restrictive policy was reinforced to some extent in 1970.
11. In Belgium the rising phase of the trend, which began about the end of 1967, continued
throughout 1969, and it was not until the begin:1ing of 1970 that it showed signs of slack-
ening. The vigorous contributions came from the usually rapid expansion of export
demand as the other member countries purchased much more and from the strong re~
covery in gross fixed asset formation. Private consumers' expenditure also rose sharply.
The rise in production gathered appreciable momentum: at constant prices, value added
by industry went up by 9,5% in 1969, as against 5,6% the previous year. With activity in
the other sectors also expanding appreciably, GNP at constant prices rose by 6'2%, as
against 3.8% in 1968.
As a result of the slowdown in productivity gains, there was a tendency for the improve-
ment in the employment situation become more marked. The decline in unemployment
continued and even gathered momentum at the beginning of 1970, leading to general
strains on the labour market.
The business upswing entailed increasing pressure on the level of domestic prices. The
rise in consumer prices was 3.75% in 1969 and rose to 4.3% in January-April 1970 above
the price level for January-April 1969.
While the overall balance of payments -for the first nine months of 1969 closed with a
deficit of BF400m., it produced a surplus of BF23 OOOm. in the period October 1969-February 1970, this being mainly a matter of "leads and lags " after the revaluation of
the mark.
12. In Luxembourg, the economic upswing strengthened significantly in 1969, borne
up mainly by exports and fixed investment. In terms of volume, the growth of GNP in
1969 may be estimated at 7%, as against 4% in 1968. Since the beginning of 1970 the pace
of growth has, however, slowed down because export demand for iron and steel products
has advanced at a less lively pace and several industries have been running at capacity.
The faster expansion of production is due not only to major productivity gains but also
to a significant rise in the numbers in paid employment. Strain on the labour market grew
in the course of the year.
Until the summer, the price trend was calm; in the second half of the year, prices were
rising somewhat more rapidly, particularly because the cost of imported manufactures
and services went up. For the full year, the consumer price index went up by 2.3%. At
the beginning of 1970, the index rose appreciably because of the switch to the V AT. The
policy pursued by the Government, however, helped to avoid excessive increases such
as could have resulted from the reform in a period of boom business conditions.
13. The economic trend in the Community in 1969 differed appreciably from the trend
in the United States, where expansion slackened sharply during this period without
however, there being any easing in the pressure on prices. The trend in the Community
also contrasts with the rather sluggish revival of economic activity in the United Kingdom.
Under the contraints imposed in monetary and budget matters, the American economy
tended to mark time. From August onwards, the index of industrial production declined.
Inflation none the less remained very rapid throughout the year (about 5,8% in annual
average terms), especially under the pressure of private investment and an increase in
costs, due largely to wage increases running well ahead of productivity gains.
14. On a liquidity basis, the United States balance of payments for 1969 closed with
the record deficit of about $7 OOOm. By contrast, the balance on an official reserve trans-
actions basis showed the heaviest surplus in many years ($2 700m.
). 1
The very sharp deterioration in the liquidity balance, which in 1968 was still virtually in
equilibrium, is mainly due to a trend reversal for special financial transactions (a deficit
of $900m. compared to a surplus of $2300m.) and to a major increase in non-recorded
exports of capital, reflected in a swollen "errors and omissions" item. Net exports of
private long-term capital accounted for $ 1 600m. of the deterioration in the external
position, this being partly due to a relaxation of the Johnson programme on capital exports.
There was no major change in the current account from one year to the other, despite an
appreciable slackening of economic expansion and despite the anti-inflationary policy
of the American authorities.
I The US balance of payments is defined in a number of different ways and this gives rise to some problems of
interpretation. It should be noted that nom: of Ihe concepts used by the American authorities matches the defini-
tion of the overall balance of payments used in the Community.Given the role played by the dollar in the international monetary system, it is clear that
the persistence of a heavy deficit on the US balance of payments is liable to disrupt the
international monetary order.
15. During 1969 the United Kingdom made considerable progress on the road to sta-
bilizing its external position, while the state of internal equilibrium deteriorated.
The restrictive measures taken under the budget bit into consumer demand and enabled
some real resources to be switched to exports. Compared with the previous year, the
growth of gross domestic product slackened distinctly and was down to 2%, after 3.5%
in 1968. Although economic activity was thus not very dynamic, the rise in prices per-
sisted and indeed gathered momentum.
16. The balance of payments staged a remarkable recovery in 1969. United Kingdom
exports, favoured by the slackening of domestic demand and the extremely lively ex-
pansion of world trade, grew appreciably faster than imports (14% in terms of value as
against 5%).  In  the circumstances, the trade deficit fell sharply, from f643m. in 1968 to
fl58m. in 1969.
The surplus on services also rose further so that the current account produced a surplus
of f415m. The basic balance showed a surplus of f398m., the best performance in many
years. The changes in its external position enabled the United Kingdom to repay, some-
times ahead of schedule, a substantial part of its external debts.
17. During 1969, interest rates were rising throughout the world and movements of short-
term capital expanded at an unusual pace.
Inflationary pressure, varying in strength from country to country in the Community, led
the national monetary authorities to tighten restrictions and this made a progressive
contribution to the rise in interest rates.
This tendency was strengthened by the monetary policy pursued by the US authorities.
As credit demand remained strong, official policy entailed a distinct rise in interest rates,
first on the American market and then for Eurodollars when American banks turned to
the Eurodollar market. The interest rates prevailing in the Community were inevitably
affected; some Member States were forced to follow the trend on the Eurodollar market
in order to avoid very heavy outflows of capital.
In the closing months of the year, short-term interest rates, which are particularly sensi~
tive to credit policy, reached their highest point in most member countries and have since
been running at very high levels although there have been signs of a decline in the United
States and on the Eurodollar market. Long-term interest rates, by contrast, appear to
be still rising in many countries. The policies pursued to restore equilibrium have failed
to prevent private individuals from acting on the assumption that the inflationary process
would continue: this has made the demand for credit very inflexible, so that inflation has
itself become an inflationary factor.
Although in this period there was no conflict between outside influences and the re-
quirements arising from the internal situation in the Community, .it is not certain that this
pattern will last or will again emerge in the future. Member countries therefore examined
ways of preventing US monetary policy hampering their own poiicies.  In  this context,
the Committee discussed the trend of interest rates on several occasions. These discus-sions enabled a large measure of agreement to be reached among the Six and this harmon-
ized attitude played an important role in discussions held at other levels.
18. The exceptional scale of short-term capital movements is mainly attributable to two
factors: firstly, there was the disparity which developed for a time between interest
rates on the national money markets and interest rates on the Eurodollar market and,
secondly, there was the prospect of parity changes, mainly for the French franc and the
mark.
For a time, interest rate escalation in the United States and also on the Eurodollar market
entailed major disparities between the yields on these markets and yields on the markets
of most other industrialized countries. This induced the banks and private individuals in
Europe to step up their holdings of securities denominated in dollars. To meet their finance
and liquidity needs, the satisfaction of which was hampered by the restrictive monetary
policy adopted by the United States, American companies and banks had to repatriate
a large part of the funds held with their subsidiaries abroad. These two factors led in some
cases to a heavy drain on the reserves of certain member countries, which were conse-
quently compelled to take safeguard measures by raising their Bank rates and/or imposing
requirements with respect to the external position of their commercial banks.
The effects which the likelihood of parity changes had on movements of short-term
capital were referred to in Sections 7 and 8 above.
ll-PARITY CHANGES: CONSULTATIONS IN THE COMMITTEE
19. In accordance with the rules, prior consultations were held within the Committee
on the parity changes made in the Community in 1969. Before an outline is given of the
conditions in which these consultations were held, it may be useful to recapitulate the
provisions which are the institutional basis of the consultations.
In accordance with Article 107 of the Treaty of Rome, which provides that "each Member
State shall treat its policy with regard to exchange rates as a matter of common interest"
the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting in the Council
adopted, on 8 May 1964, a declaration confirming their intention to consult each other
prior to any change in the parities of their currencies. In conformity with instructions
received pursuant to this declaration, the Committee worked out the procedure for these
consultations.
20. Council Regulation No. 129 of23 October 1962 requires that the common agricultural
prices are to be express.ed in units of account, and Council Regulation No. 653/68/CEE
of May 1968 lays down the rules governing changes in the value of the unit of account as
used for this purpose. So as to facilitate the preparation of the decisions to be taken by
the Council in the event of a change in a Member State s parity, the Committee has to
render an opinion on the desirability of changing the value of the unit of .account and/or
certain agricultural prices. Where such changes are made it is also incumbent on the
Committee to examine the situation created in the relevant fields, render an opinion on
the economic and monetary implications of the automatic adjustment of the prices ex-
pressed in national currencies and state its views as to whether it is desirable for the
Member State concerned to make arrangements temporarily mitigating the impact of
these automatic adjustments.21. These rules were applied for the first time when Community countries decided to
change their parities in 1969: in connection with the devaluation of the French franc,
prior consultations were held during the meeting .of the Committee of 10 August 1969
while in respect of the revaluation of the mark the rules were applied in two stages:
(i) The decision by the German Government to allow the rate of exchange of the mark
to float led, on the occasion of the annuallMF meeting in Washington, to a meeting
of the Committee and a meeting of the Ministers of Finance of the Six on 29 Sep-
tember;
(ii) Prior consultations were held on the definitive fixing of the new parity for the mark
at the meetings of the Committee of 8 October and 24 and 25 October 1969.
These consultations enabled the other Member States to obtain detailed information on
the measures envisaged and to express their views. Experience has shown, however, that
this procedure could be improved: it is important to ensure that the consultations are
held before any important measure, for their efficacy is largely a function of their timing.
22. The meetings of the Committee on 10 August and 24 and 25 October were devoted
mainly to an examination of the impact of the parity changes on the functioning of the
common market in agriculture: despite the unit-of-account technique adopted, a change
in exchange rates is necessarily a threat to price uniformity for farm products in the com-
mon market. The Committee had to express its views on the advisability of changing the
value of the unit of account or the agricultural prices. In both cases, i.e. on the occasion
of the devaluation of the French franc and the revaluation of the mark, the Committee
came out against changes of this kind.
Normal application of the unit of account would have meant that when the French franc
was devalued, the agricultural prices expressed in French francs would have gone up
automatically in proportion to the rate of devaluation. The success of the devaluation
would therefore have been jeopardized from the outset because higher farm prices would
strengthen inflationary tendencies in France.
Conversely, the revaluation of the mark would have entailed an automatic cut in agri~
cultural prices when expressed in marks. Unless modified, this arrangement would have
entailed an immediate and appreciable fall in farm incomes in Germany.
These considerations led the Committee to express the view that the two governments
should be able to take temporary and degressive measures to cushion the impact of an
automatic adjustment of the agricultural prices in terms of national currencies, it being
understood that these measures should comprise no impediments to free trade in the
Community.
HI-CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY PROBLEMS
23. In the period under review, two important decisions were taken in this field. At the
general meeting of 3 October 1969, the Board of Governors of the 1M F decided to create
special drawing rights (SDRs). At the-beginning of 1970 it was decided, in accordance
with the Articles of Agreement of the 1M F under which the quotas of the members areto be reviewed every five years, to increase these quotas. When these decisions were
being prepared, consultations were held on them within the Committee.
24. When policies on the creation of the SDRs were being agreed, the Committee had
in particular to express its views on the desirability of activating the scheme, on the
amounts of the SDRs to be created and the duration of the commitments to be entered
into. The position adopted by the Six on these three points following the consultations
went far to enable general agreement to be reached within the IMF and made it possible,
during the negotiations, to bring more ambitious proposals back to a level acceptable
to the Community.
The decision taken provides for the creation of SDRs as from 1 January 1970 in amounts
of $3 500m. and of $3 OOOm. for each of the years 1971 and 1972. This arrangement was
based on certain assumptions concerning the trend in other sources of international
liquidity, particularly the balance of payments of the United States. It is evident that
increased caution would have to be exercised in this field if these assumptions proved
unfounded in the years to come.
25. The decision to increase the quotas, taken under the rule providing for a review at
intervals of five years and scheduled to take effect in the autumn of this year, will also
strengthen the means of action available to the 1M F. Negotiations on this subject proved
particularly difficult at international level. The consultations within the Committee
brought out in detail the views held, making it easier for the Six to align progressively the
attitudes which they were to adopt in the discussions held in a wider international context.
From 30 October 1970, the sum total of the quotas of the members of the IMF is to be
raised from $21 300m. to $28900m., which is an increase of about 36%, while the share
of the Community countries will go up from $3 17Jm. to $5 474m., lifting the Community
share in the total from 17-7% to 18-9%. The increase decided upon is the result of an
across-the-board adjustment in the quotas of the order of 25% and of selective increases
intended to take into account the changes that have taken place in the economic and
financial stature of certain members of the IMF.
Although the rate of increase may appear to be substantial, it should be recalled that the
liquidities involved are conditional in nature, i.e. they are intended to help finance tempo-
rary deficits and recourse to them is made subject to stipulations concerning economic
policy.
IV -CLOSER CO-ORDINATION OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY POLICIES
26. The Memorandum on the co-ordination of economic policies and monetary co-
operation within the Community which the Commission had sent to the Council on
12 February 1969 contained proposals on which the Committee stated its views in its Opin-
ion of 10 May 1969. 1 These proposals, the underlying principle of which was endorsed
by the Council, served asa starting point for further progress in the co-ordination of
economic policy and towards monetary solidarity.
27- In the field of economic policy, the joint establishment of medium-term objectives
was, in the .first instance, a matter for the Medium-term Economic Policy Committee.
1 See annex to the Eleventh Report on the Activities of the Monetary Committee.In this connection, the Monetary Committee noted that at its meeting of 26 January 1970
the Council adopted preliminary broad guidelines. The Committee had been closely
associated with the implementation of the proposals on the co:1certing of short-term
policies. These proposals were given concrete form in the Council decision of 17 July 1969.
which puts Member States under the obligation to hold prior consultations on any short-
term policy decision which would have a substantial impact on the economies of the other
member countries or which would depart from the medium-term objectives established
jointly. A safeguard clause dispenses the Member States from holding prior consultations,
in emergency circumstances.
A further decision, of 16 February 1970, laid down procedural requirements, established
by the Commission in co-operation with the Short-term Economic Policy Committee.
28. Several consultations took place in 1969, in accordance with the rules laid down by
the decision of 17 July 1969. Immediately following the devaluation of the Frencl) franc,
the Committee had to examine the French stabilization programme before it was finally
adopted. The Belgian project to postpone the introduction of V AT was also discussed
in the Committee. Lastly, in October a consultation was held on the suspension, by the
German Government, of export levies and import refunds. This consultation, by the .nature
of the subject and in view of the background against which it was held, necessarily re-
sulted in an exchange of views on the fixing of a new parity for the mark.
29. On monetary solidarity, the Memorandum of 12 February 1969 included the proposal
to create mechanisms for giving short-term monetary support and medium-term financial
assistance. The Council instructed the Committee of Governors of Central Banks to
work out an agreement setting up between the Central Banks of the Member States a
system of short-term monetary support. This agreement, which entered into force on
9 February 1970, assigns to each participating bank a quota that determines the level of
support which it may ask for and the level of support which it agrees to finance; the
assistance arrangements cover a total of $ 1 OOOm., with the possibility of their being
extended by a further $ 1 OOOm. at most. Recourse to the system is automatically, and
within the shortest possible period, followed by special consultation on the economic
situation of the beneficiary country. Under the decision of 16 February 1970, consultation
must take place within the Committee.
30. The Council invited the Committee to put forward its views on the implementing
procedures for a Community system of medium-term financial assistance. These views
were given in a report of 10 April 1970, which outlines the objectives of such a system
and the conditions in which it could be set up.
In the report, the Committee states that medium-term financial assistance is the co~
operation machinery by means of which the Member States grant each other the financial
assistance provided for under Article 108(2 c) of the Treaty (mutual assistance). The fact
that the progressive establishment of economic and monetary union may temporarily
have an unfavourable impact on the balance of payments equilibrium of the Member
States is one of the reasons why this machinery is needed. The reciprocal granting of
financial aid among the countries of the Common Market would therefore demonstrate
their solidarity in a way that would alleviate or partly remedy the difficulties that may
arise within individual countries.The chief aims of such assistance would be:
(i) To contribute to the smooth functioning of the common market by reducing the risk
of a Member State invoking the safeguard clauses of the Treaty;
(ii) To accelerate the process of economic integration by promoting the harmonization
of short- and medium-term policies (notably through the economic policy stipulations
imposed when assistance is granted) and by preparing the establishment of economic
and monetary union among the Six.
As for the mechanism itself, the Committee studied procedural rules, links with the 1M F,
funds committed, the distribution of the ceilings on the commitments, and the duration
of assistance; special attention was given to the problem of the liquidity of the claims.
Given the importance that would attach to the institution of this system, particularly
from the angle of the establishment of economic and monetary union, the Committee
has thought it expedient to publish this report as an annex.
31. As part of the drive to strengthen co-ordination of monetary policies, the Council
and the Commission invited the Committee to render an opinion on the Commission
Memorandum to the Council of 5 March 1969 on "Capital movements: the case for
action, procedures to be adopted". This Memorandum recommends measures to help
advance the liberalization of capital movements, reduce discrimination, and harmonize
the organization of domestic markets and the tax rules liable to affect capital movements.
In its Opinion of 30 June 1970 the Committee stated that "there is a need to bring the
authorities supervising the capital markets to concert all their policies in respect of these
markets. The concerting of policies should go hand in hand with the efforts to harmonize
monetary and credit policies. It would in particular facilitate the pursuit of two important
objectives, namely:
0) Greater convergence of the measures adopted at national level with a view to
strengthening the markets of the Member States and improving the conditions in
which they operate;
Oi) A more systematic search for common attitudes on developments covering a wider
area than the common market, such as the trends in interest rates or on the inter-
national capital markets.
Lastly, the Committee examined Part II of the Report from the Working Party on Secu-
rities Markets giving an account of Member States' policies with regard to their fixed-
interest securities markets from 1966 to 1969. It decided to publish this Report and keep
the Working Party in being, extending its responsibilities to cover all capital market
problems. A main task for the Working Party will be to seek out ways and means of
promoting and facilitating progressive integration of the capital markets.ANNEX I
REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION
In accordance with instructions adopted by the Council on 17 July 1969, the Committee
submitted to the Council of Ministers, on 17 January 1970, its interim report on the
conclusions it had arrived at with regard to certain aspects of the establishment within
the Community of a system of medium-term financial assistance.
The present report sums up the Committee s views on the problem seen as a whole.
1. Objectives of the system
The system of medium-term financial assistance is the co-operation machinery by means
of which Member States grant each other the financial assistance provided for under
Article 108(2 c) of the Treaty (mutual assistance). The fact that the progressive establish~
ment of economic and monetary union may temporarily have an unfavourable impact
on the balance .of payments equilibrium of the Member States is one of the reasons why
this machinery is needed. The reciprocal granting of financial aid among the countries
of the Common Market would thus demonstrate their solidarity in a way that would
alleviate, or partly remedy, the difficulties that may arise within individual countries.
The chief aims of medium-term financial assistance are:
(a) To contribute to the smooth functioning of the Common Market by reducing the risk
of a Member State invoking the safeguard clauses of the Treaty;
(b) To accelerate the process of economic integration by promoting the harmonization
of short- and medium-term policies (notably through the economic policy stipulations
imposed when assistance is granted) and by preparing the establishment of economic
and monetary union among the Six.
Medium-term financial assistance must not be looked upon as the consolidation of short-
term aid granted by the banks of issue. Short-term aid does not necessarily lead to medium-
term aid. Medium-term support may very well be granted to a country which has not
already used short-term aid at all.
Procedural rules
On the question of the creation of the machinery, the obligation for each Member State
to supply funds up to a specified ceiling should flow from a Council decision adoptedunanimously and approved by the Parliaments of the individual Member States. This
obligation should cover a period of several years,  for  instance five years, renewable by
tacit agreement. Every Member State would have the right to notify, at the latest six
months before the end of the period, its intention to withdraw.
In the interests of greater flexibility., provision should, however, be made  for  a procedure
making it possible, under the conditions mentioned above, to modify the implementing
details and the amount involved even before the first period of five years has expired.
This procedure could be set in motion by a Member State or by the Commission after
consultation with the Committee.
Any decision on the granting of medium-term financial assistance should be taken by the
Council by a qualified majority vote and should include the economic policy stipulations
governing the grant of assistance. In this respect it would appear that the conditions
imposed in the event of recourse to the Community system should be as stringent as
those deriving  from  the rules and practices of the IMF.
As a general rule, any drawing made under the Community system would have to be
financed by the creditor countries proportionally to the size of their commitments.
Any Member State invoking balance of payments difficulties and/or a deterioration in
its reserve position would be given the benefit of the doubt and could refrain from helping
to finance a financial support scheme.
3. Links with the IMF
All appropriate links should be established between a Community system of medium-
term financial assistance and the monetary co-operation machinery established under the
International Monetary Fund. Arrangements should be made allowing of the greatest
measure of flexibility when decisions are to be taken in such cases. Depending on the
circumstances, it might therefore be appropriate to confine intervention either to the
Community system or to the Fund, or to arrange fer assistance involving a combination
of the two systems. This is why a general clause is needed requiring that any recourse
by a member country to international medium-term credit facilities must be preceded by
consultation in the Committee, no matter what the circumstances.
An exchange of information and appropriate contacts between the 1M F and the EEC
would facilitate the necessary co-ordination of financial aid under the International
Monetary Fund and medium-term financial assistance  from  the EEc.
Two members consider it essential that a procedure should be established in advance
for  co-operation between the Community and the 1M F. The aim of co-operation would
be to establish, case by case, with due regard to the nature of the deficit and the location
of its counterpart, whether the 1M F machinery and that  of  the Community should be
used together  or  the Community machinery used alone. Where applicable, efforts should
in particular be made to seek agreement on the economic and monetary policy stipulations
to be accepted by the member country which is granted the facilities, and on methods of
refinancing with the 1 MF, if necessary, the credit facilities granted under this mechanism.
In this connection the Council should, at an early date, take the decisions necessary  for
arranging appropriate consultations with the IMF.4. Level of the Funds
The scale of the system should be comparable to the one agreed upon by the Governors
of the Central Banks of the EEC in the agreement establishing short-term monetary
support.
The maximum level of the financial commitment to which each Member State may be
asked to subscribe would be fixed by the Council under the procedure outlined above
under Section 2, first paragraph. The ceiling on total commitments could initially be fixed
at 2000 million units of account. 
Consideration could be given to placing an individual limit from the outset on the debts
contracted by each Member State. It may, however, be held that it must be for the Council
to fix in each individual case the limits on indebtedness, which would enabl.e it to regulate
intervention according to the circumstances. Under such a procedure it would, however,
be particularly important to ensure that the claims built up within the system remain
sufficiently liquid (see Section 9 below) and to prevent excessive use being made of the
facilities available under the system.
5. Proportion of allocation of commitments
The scale fixing the commitments could be modelled on the scale for Member States
IMF quotas. The percentages laid down for short-term monetary support could also be













6. Duration of credit facilities
Facilities granted under the system should normally run for two to five years. However,
in order to ensure a higher level of liquidity at the beginning, consideration should be
given to limiting facilities to two to three years during an initial period of no more than
three years from the date the system actually started to operate.
7. Interest rates
Some members of the Committee feel that the rate of interest for credit facilities granted
under this system should be similar to those charged by the IMF (at the moment averaging
2 to 3'5%, varying with the duration and level of indebtedness). Other members consider
that interest rates should run at a level close to the current maljket rate.
By way of compromise, the members of the Committee would contemplate a rate half-
way between the market rates and the rates charged by the IMF.
1 Some members feel that this amount is not high enough while others would have preferred it to be lower.A similar problem arose in respect of arrangements to refinance the claims built up under
the system. The Committee agreed that there should be no change in the level of the
interest rate if the facility. is refinanced within the system. Where refinancing would be
taking place outside the system, however, the extra cost involved could be borne by the
debtor country or could be shared out, according to a scale to be established, among all
countries participating in this system; the Committee has, however, not arrived at a final
conclusion on this point.
8. Currency denomination of claims
The credit facilities granted under the system could be denominated in a Community
unit of account to be defined. 1 Should it prove necessary to refinance an outstanding
credit by calling on institutions from outside (BIS and/or capital markets), the debtor
country would have to accept that the currency in which its debt was originally denomi-
nated be replaced by the currency of the refinancing operation.
9. Liquidity of claims
As a general rule, the debtor country should be required to repay the whole or part of
the credit ahead of schedule in the event of a balance of payments improvement to be
defined according to certain criteria yet to be fixed.
Should the creditor country itself run into balance of payments difficulties and should
the external position of the debtor country fail to improve sufficiently, there is the problem
of the liquidity of the claims since the creditor would have to be able to mobilize his claim
at any moment. Two possibilities must be envisaged here:
1. Claims may be transferred to other Member States within the ceiling on their com-
mitments, due regard being paid to the exceptions provided for under Section 2, fifth
paragraph, concerning the balance of payments trend .and the reserve position.
2. There can be no such transfer as the ceilings on the commitments of the other Member
States have already been reached or cannot be taken advantage of because the waiver
of Section 2, fifth paragraph, applies. 
In this second case, it is essential to provide for the use of one or more of the following
procedures, without the order in which they are listed being a guide to the order in which
they should be used:
1. Refinancing by the BIS and/or on the capital markets.
2. Recourse by the debtor country to its unused drawing facilities with the IMF or to its
reserves. In both cases, the debtor country could, under a gentleman s agreement
concluded when the drawing is made, give an undertaking that it would not use,
without the prior agreement of the creditor country or countries, a specified propor-
tion of its facilities, this proportion to be fixed in relation to the amount of the drawing.
1 On this point it should be recalled that the Council, on the initiative of the Netherlands Minister of Finance, has
requested that a study be made of ways and means of eliminating differences between the various units of ac"
count used in the European Communities.3. Increasing the liquidity of the system by using the resources which the member
countries would decide, when the time had come, to pool according to appropriate
procedures.
Several members recall that in an Opinion of the Committee rendered on 10 May 1969
they had expressed the view that in order to give substance to the idea-put forward by
the Commission in support of the proposals made in its Memorandum of 12 February
1969- of providing a "forecourt" for the reception of new members, "those countries
which have applied for membership of the Community should be informed ofthe proposals
before a decision is taken, as this would allow them to express any views they might have
on the subject.ANNEX II
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